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A New Strategy against Hostile Takeovers: a Model of 
Defense in Participations 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article examines the efficacy of a “defense in participations” policy consisting of 
competitors acquiring cross equity participations within the same industry to prevent hostile 
takeovers. This defense in participations strategy provides disincentive for raiders as partial 
ownerships increase market power of competitors and then reinforce the “outsider effect”. Also, 
we find conditions for a general result which states that takeovers are less profitable in an 
industry with participations rather than in an industry without any capital links. We provide 
information to regulators about the positive social impact of cross participations in the context of 
mergers, and expose an economic dilemma between a “laisser-faire” and an interventionist 
approach. 
 
Keywords Takeovers · Defense · Participations · Regulation 
 
JEL Classification G34 · L22 · L41 
 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
A hostile takeover consists of buying shares of another corporation for the purpose of taking 
control of its management and of receiving its dividends. The raider (the acquiring firm) 
announces its desire to buy back targeted company’s shares at a premium. The level of the 
premium is set to encourage shareholders to sell their stake and also partially reflects potential 
synergies
1
 of the merger. According to Manne (1965) and Jensen (1986), the primary synergies 
                                                           
1
 The takeover by Hewlett-Packard of Autonomy is an example of an excessive premium paid by the acquirer based 
on miscalculated synergies and goodwill value. 
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arise mostly from a change in the management because poorly controlled companies are easy 
targets for raiders. Further, a substantial premium can prevent other competitors entering a bid 
race for the acquisition of the firm. Achieving better results than competitors is the best defense 
against raiders, but a hostile takeover does not always constitute a credible threat for 
underperforming managers. Indeed, Grossman & Hart (1980) state that in the case of a takeover 
both managers and shareholders will be harmed; however this idea is criticized by Deman (1994). 
Numerous other strategies against hostile buyouts have been imagined and implemented such as: 
Pac-Man
2
, Shark Repellents, Crown Jewels, Poison Pills, or antitakeover provisions (ATPs). All 
these strategies do not directly modify the capital structure of the target. However, in the context 
of buyouts the question of capital appears to be crucial. 
Most of the time, a takeover is preceded by a small acquisition of capital, a toehold which 
proves beneficial to take control of the firm because it increases the amount necessary for 
competitors to win the battle. Bulow et al. (1999) thus find that competitors have no incentive to 
overbid the toehold acquirer, because of the winner’s curse effect
3
. The literature related to 
agency costs (Fama, 1980; Easterbrook, 1984), or to antitakeover amendments (DeAngelo & 
Rice, 1983; Garell & Poulsen, 1987), and to toeholds (Choi, 1991; Betton et al., 2009) has 
flourished. However fundamental questions on takeover incentives still remain. For example, 
Inderst & Wey (2004) examine the profitability of takeovers in Bertrand and in Cournot 
competing industries, where incentives increase along with substitutability and independency of 
goods respectively. 
To achieve diversification, the cross participations can be acquired in the capital of rivals 
operating in the same or in different economic regions, into suppliers and clients firms, or 
unrelated businesses. Partial ownerships can also be also used to reinforce market power by 
linking profit objectives of firms at the horizontal level (Perotti, 1992; Reitman, 1994), in a 
vertical relationship (Greenlee & Raskovich, 2006), or in a mixed framework (Serbera, 2010). 
The theoretical (see e.g. Malueg, 1992; O’brien & Salop, 2000) and applied (see e.g. Reiffen, 
1998) literature on partial ownerships is extensive but little exists on equity participations 
strategies as a defense to hostile takeovers. An historic example of a defensive strategy appeared 
during the first step of privatization of French State-owned companies (such as Saint-Gobain, 
Paribas, Société Générale) starting in 1986: the “noyaux-durs” (or literally hard cores in English). 
There are several examples of “defense in participations” policies equivalent across the 
world:  
-The “Keiretsu”, which constitute a complex network of equity participations arranged by a bank 
and linking corporations in Japan
4
 were widely studied in empirical literature (Flath, 1990; 
Brown & Fung, 2009). 
-The “Deutschland AG” (Franks & Mayer, 1998; Lantenois, 2011) which uses capital 
arrangements to align the interests of the financial and industrial companies with those of the 
employees whilst reducing the number of supervisory boards.  
-The “golden shares
5
” policy in the United Kingdom implemented during the Thatcher 
privatization era (see Yergin & Stanislaw, 1998). The British government started acquiring a 
                                                           
2
 The Pacman defense was named with reference to the famous video games’ character; it consists of absorbing 
competitors or in increasing capital to enhance firm’s value. 
3
 This is related to the theory of auctions in incomplete information. This effect states that the winner of the auction 
overpays eventually ending up with a loss. 
4
 Mitsubishi is an illustrative example of Keiretsu, its organization serves several purposes such as ease of financing, 
independence of governance, diversification or market power. 
5
 The term of golden shares is generically used to designate this type of participations arrangement. 
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small percentage of (preferred) shares of strategic companies such as Rolls-Royces, allowing it to 
nominate board’s members and apply a veto’s power in certain circumstances. 
All these “defenses in participations” consist of creating a core of shareholders through 
over-the-counter shares acquisitions following advices from investment banks. More precisely, 
freshly privatized companies were acquiring shares of capital in each other in order to constitute a 
stable pool of stakeholders able to prevent any hostile takeover. The connection between BNP 
Paribas and AXA acquiring around 5% of each other at the time
6
 in France, and Deutsche Bank 
with an acquisition of 4.1% in Allianz in Germany, were famous examples of “golden shares”. 
Since the end of privatizations in western countries, these strategies are no longer imposed, but 
existing shares still give governments a veto on major decisions such as takeovers. For example 
in 2012, BAE’s merger with EADS (now Airbus) was blocked by the UK government which 
exercised its right to enforce the golden share rule. The particular case of the “noyaux-durs” 
policy has been criticized afterwards by Goldstein (1996). He notes firstly, the make-up of the 
core of shareholders was mostly based on financial considerations and missed the opportunity of 
creating synergies following the participations arrangement. Secondly, the process of acquisition 
of partial ownerships lacked transparency. As a consequence of its lack of transparency, the price 
paid by the State for the shares did not include the control premium and was below the market 
price paid by private investors. 
More generally, despite criticisms of the opacity of the design and the implementation of 
these governmental policies, the use of partial horizontal ownerships (PHO) as a defense against 
hostile takeovers raises many questions. In the context of mergers’ profitability and incentives, 
when silent participations are possible we can cite Foros et al. (2011). They assert that the 
accrued profitability resulting from a partial (but controlling) ownership arrangement is greater 
than after a full merger. This greater profitability comes from increased barriers to entry after the 
participations arrangement becomes publicly observable. In the case of a majority ownership, the 
two firms are controlled by the same managers. However, in this article, we study the impact of a 
defense in participations on takeover incentives in an industry where firms can acquire partial 
non-controlling (also called silent
7
 or passive) and reciprocal shares (cross participations) in the 
capital of competitors. In our model with silent ownerships, each management remains in place 
and decides upon its own production despite internalizing rival’s profit up to its participation 
level. By using passive participations instead of controlling on s, we are thus able to differentiate 
between the effect of participations and that of mergers. More precisely, this article highlights the 
influence of cross participations on takeover incentives by determining their profitability in a 
Cournot oligopoly model with n firms producing differentiated goods.  
Our model finds a simple solution where PHO constitute an effective defense against 
hostile takeovers by reducing incentives to raid protected firms inside the industry. As a more 
general result, we show that when comparing two different industries, a hostile buyout is less 
likely in an industry where companies use the defense in participations strategy rather than in an 
industry without any capital links between the firms. We refine the result on the efficiency of the 
defense in participations relatively to the number of competing firms, and we obtain the defense 
                                                           
6
 Ended in 2010 
7
 Silent ownerships are a common practice between competing firms. In the case of listed firms all regulatory 
ownerships thresholds are regularly reported to financial markets regulatory agencies. The type of shares determines 
associated voting rights. As long as the ownership remains minority participation (below 50%) the only impact on 
other firm managers’ decisions is the co-integration of profits. As a consequence, this assumption rules out decisions 
such as stopping activity or shutting down the partially acquired firm. In this paper we only consider participations 
through class B shares (giving a claim on capital and no voting rights); this allows us to call them silent. 
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is more powerful in a less concentrated industry. In this case, a weaker market power leads to 
reduction of expected profits following a merger. The intuitive explanation of the efficiency of 
this defense strategy in PHO mainly arises from an increased “outsider effect
8
” of merger (see 
Salant et al., 1983) brought by the cross participations.  
This study adds an innovative defense strategy against hostile takeovers to already 
existing ones, and opens the field for regulation in various ways. In a conservative approach this 
defense is effective against hostile buyouts over strategic sectors (weapons, nuclear, 
communications) from foreign competitors, but in a more liberal one it raises barriers against the 
self-regulation of the market (even if it leads to less competition). 
 
2 Model and Set-Up 
 
Table 1 presents detailed notations for the Cournot-Nash oligopoly model composed of n firms 
competing in quantities. 
 
n Number of firms in the industry 
α  Cross partial ownership  
γ  Substitutability parameter 
ip  Final price for good i 
iq  Output of good i 
c  Marginal cost of production (constant) 
iπ  Profit of Firm i 
A Demand Parameter (constant) 
 
Tab. 1. Notation 
 
Definition A defense in participations is a mutual agreement in which two firms acquire cross 
participations in the capital of each other. 
(i) In the context of the defense policy, participations are set at an equal percentage: α12 = α21 = α. 
(ii) Equity holdings are silent minority stakes, giving the acquirer no right in the other firm 
management decisions. 
 
Within the industry I = {1,…,n}, Firm 1 and Firm 2 are linked by symmetrical cross 
partial horizontal ownerships (PHO). As a consequence, we do not consider the stage of 
                                                           
8
 In the context of an oligopoly, the “outsider effect” states that it is more beneficial to stay outside a merger than be 
part of it. As a reaction to the merger, outsiders increase their production more than the merged firm which 
internalize the profits of two firms, outsiders then end up more profitable. 
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participations choice in this model. Each firm behaves as an owner-managed
9
 entity. 
Firms individually produce quantity of a substitutable good. The magnitude of 
substitutability depends on the substitutability parameter γ, γ ∈  ]0;1[.We only consider 
substitutable goods in order
10
 to study the impact of participations and takeovers in a quantity 
competing oligopoly. For simplicity we assume that marginal costs of production, transformation 
and retail are constant. We suppose that the demand curve is linear:  j
ij
ii qqAp
≠
∑−−= γ , ∀i, ∀j,
∈  I. Profit maximization considers operative profit (revenues minus costs), plus the share α in 
the capital of a rival (for linked firms only). The following figure illustrates the organization of 
the industry: 
 
 
Fig. 1 The defense in participations in an oligopoly 
 
We consider two distinct situations in this model. The first stage of the model discussed in 
Section 3 before any buyout. The second stage of the model discussed in Section 3.2.1-3.2.2 
models the effects of the takeover. The effects of the takeover upon an unprotected firm (Section 
3.2.1) and protected firms (Section 3.2.2) are discussed separately. By computing equilibrium 
profits we are able to compare pre and post-takeover profits and then derive firms’ incentives to 
merge depending on their participations links α. 
 
3 Solutions 
 
3.1 Pre-Takeover 
 
We begin the resolution of the model by the first stage, before any buyout. Before a 
hypothetical buyout, the industry is composed of n firms competing in quantities; each company 
behaves individually with the objective of maximizing its profit. Within the n firms only Firms 
1-2 internalize profits of each other relative to the cross participation α. In the following, we 
                                                          
9
 The company is both manager and principal shareholder; we thus avoid conflicts of interest. 
10
 When γ = 0, goods are independent and demand becomes inelastic, and as a consequence all firms produce the 
same output quantity up to their capacity constraints. Also, we set γ ≠ 1 to differentiate consumer’s demand vis-a-vis 
the firms’ goods. 
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derive profits for Firms 1 and 2 linked by minority cross participations α, α ∈  ]0;0.5[: 
 
2
},2,1{\
21
1
},2,1{\
211
)(
))(1(
qqqqqcA
qqqqqcA
j
iIj
i
j
iIj
i
∈
∈
∑−−−−−+
∑−−−−−−=
γγγα
γγγαπ
    (1) 
 
1
},2,1{\
21
2
},2,1{\
212
)(
))(1(
qqqqqcA
qqqqqcA
j
iIj
i
j
iIj
i
∈
∈
∑−−−−−+
∑−−−−−−=
γγγα
γγγαπ
    (2) 
 
Then, the profit of a firm without equity participations and representative of the majority 
of the industry can be calculated as 
 
ij
iIj
ii qqqqqcA )(
},2,1\{
21
∈
∑−−−−−= γγγπ      (3) 
 
Solving simultaneously we obtain equilibrium quantities noted with a 
*
. We thus observe 
that quantities q1
*
 and q2
*
 set by linked firms (with participation α) are inferior to quantities qi
*
 set 
by other firms without PHO: q1
*
 = q2
*
 < qi
*
, the inequality holds for γ ∈  ]0;1[. This expected 
result comes from partial internalization of cross profits. The more α increases, the more Firms 1 
and 2 internalize profits of each other and cut their output. In turn, Firms 1-2 are incentivized to 
tacitly collude and this softens competition. But, in reaction to Firms 1-2 reduction in output, 
rival firms increase their own production and replace the lost quantities at the higher price. In the 
end, we obtain the traditional result of the “outsider effect” (see Salant et al., 1983): the one 
outside the participations benefit from the tacit collusion by capturing the additional revenue. 
Replacing equilibrium quantities found (1), (2) and (3) we thus obtain equilibrium profits. As the 
quantities from outsiders exceed insiders’ ones, the same is true for profits
11
: ∗∗∗ => 21 πππ i . In 
the following subsection, we study equilibrium profits of all firms in the industry after a takeover 
has happened. 
 
3.2 Post-Takeover 
 
In our study the raid is conducted by a firm outside
12
 of the defense in participations in order to 
specifically test the solidity of this strategy of defense. We distinguish two cases for the buyout: 
-Firstly, toward an unprotected (non-linked) firm 
-Secondly, toward a protected firm (with participations). 
 
3.2.1  Takeover of an Unprotected Firm 
 
We then begin with Firm i taking over Firm j, both are unprotected. We note Mπ  the expression 
                                                           
11
 Please refer to the Appendix for the expression of equilibrium profits relevant to incentives calculations in Section 
4. 
12
 As our research places in the context of a defensive economic policy, the consequences of a protected firm raiding 
a competitor are left for further research on the subject. 
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of the new merged entity’s profits. It maximizes joint profits of firms i and j relative to qi and qj: 
 
jl
kjiIl
kji
il
kjiIl
kjiM
qqqqqqqcA
qqqqqqqcA
)(
)(
},,,2,1{\
21
},,,2,1{\
21
∈
∈
∑−−−−−−−+
∑−−−−−−−=
γγγγγ
γγγγγπ
   (4) 
 
Given the sum of these two concave
13
 profit functions is a concave function, we are able 
to determine the equilibrium output of the merged firm. Moreover, a symmetrical equilibrium can 
exist because reaction functions ,.)( ji qq  and ,.)( ij qq  are symmetrical, and by equalizing qi 
and qj we obtain a unique solution of post-merger quantity marked with an M: qM. The profit 
expression of the other firms does not move, but now Firms i and j have to be separated from 
other unprotected firms. We then introduce the notation ql for quantities of unprotected outsiders. 
We first derive the profit expressions of the two protected firms: 
 
2
},,,2,1{\
21
1
},,,2,1{\
211
)(
))(1(
qqqqqqqcA
qqqqqqqcA
l
kjiIl
kji
l
kjiIl
kji
∈
∈
∑−−−−−−−+
∑−−−−−−−−=
γγγγγα
γγγγγαπ
  (5) 
 
1
},,,2,1{\
21
2
},,,2,1{\
212
)(
))(1(
qqqqqqqcA
qqqqqqqcA
l
kjiIl
kji
l
kjiIl
kji
∈
∈
∑−−−−−−−+
∑−−−−−−−−=
γγγγγα
γγγγγαπ
  (6) 
 
These profit expressions being symmetrical ensures that equilibrium quantities will be 
symmetrical too. The profit expression for Firm k, unprotected and out of the merger, is derived 
as follows: 
 
kl
kjiIl
kjik qqqqqqqcA )(
},,,2,1{\
21
∈
∑−−−−−−−= γγγγγπ    (7) 
 
Solving simultaneously for quantities, we obtain the expression of equilibrium quantities 
noted with a 
**
. By ranking these quantities we find: 
****
2
**
1
**
kM qqqq <=< , ∀ 0>γ . Here also 
we obtain that the more the profits are integrated (partially with participations or totally for the 
buyout), the more the reduction of joint output is important. In the case of the merged firms, the 
output’s decision is commonly set but each firm produces individually
14
. We expect that the 
profits will follow the same ranking: bigger profits for the unprotected firms and out of the 
buyout, then the defended firms and then merged firms. By replacing equilibrium quantities 
found in (5), (6), and (7) we obtain equilibrium profits. The ranking
15
 is expressed as follows: 
2
21
∗∗
∗∗∗∗∗∗ >=> Mk
π
πππ  for any positive value of the parameters n, c, or γ. This comparison thus 
                                                           
13
 Please refer to the Appendix for the proof of concavity of the firms’ individual profit functions. 
14
 The two firms (having symmetrical profit functions) choose the same individual output. 
15
 Please note that in this ranking we consider πM
**/2 as the merged entity includes the sum of the two firms’ profits 
with double qM quantities. 
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confirms the role of the “outsider effect” on profitability. This result appears as a preview for the 
study of buyout incentives in Section 4. In the following, we study the second case of a takeover 
equilibrium with one of the two protected firms being the target. 
 
3.2.2  Takeover of a Protected Firm 
 
We consider here that Firm i launches a raid on Firm 1, the following expression marked with a 
′
M  is a sum of: Firm 1’s profit plus the portion α of profit held in Firm 2 plus the whole profit of 
the raider (Firm i): 
 
( )
ik
jiIk
ji
k
jiIk
ji
k
jiIk
jiM
qqqqqqcA
qqqqqqcA
qqqqqqcA
)(
)(
)(1
},,2,1{\
21
2
},,2,1{\
21
1
},,2,1{\
21
∈
∈
∈
′
∑−−−−−−+
∑−−−−−−+
∑−−−−−−−=
γγγγ
γγγγα
γγγγαπ
   (8) 
 
1π  and iπ  being concaves, then 
′
Mπ  is concave. Furthermore, the expression of 
′
Mπ  
being asymmetrical, we obtain two non-symmetrical reaction functions as a result of 
maximization of a single profit. The profit expressions for the other firms (Firm 2 and Firm j) are 
as follows: 
 
( )
1
},,2,1{\
21
2
},,2,1{\
212
)(
)(1
qqqqqqcA
qqqqqqcA
k
jiIk
ji
k
jiIk
ji
∈
∈
∑−−−−−−+
∑−−−−−−−=
γγγγα
γγγγαπ
   (9) 
 
jk
jiIk
jij qqqqqqcA )(
},,2,1{\
21
∈
∑−−−−−−= γγγγπ    (10) 
 
We derive reaction functions for Firms 2 and j, and then by solving simultaneously the 
four reactions functions we obtain equilibrium output quantities noted with a 
***
. We then derive 
a ranking: 
******
2
******
1 ji qqqq <<<  which is a consequence (once again) of the outsider’s effect. 
More explicitly, profit internalizing firms tacitly collude and reduce their output relative to the 
magnitude of their holdings. Firm j 16 which is not internalizing any rival’s profit set the greater 
quantity of output at equilibrium for a uniform price and thus generates the greater individual 
profit. We also find a similar ranking for profits and quantities with 
2
2
∗∗∗′
∗∗∗∗∗∗ >> Mj
π
ππ . These 
differences arise from the magnitude of profit internalization and are a consequence of the 
“outsider effect”. So far, we have computed equilibrium profits before the takeover, then in the 
case of raids on a protected and on an unprotected firm. In the following section we study firms’ 
incentives for a takeover in a comparative static framework. 
 
4 Incentives 
                                                           
16
 Firm j is representative of the n-3 firms outside of participation arrangements and of the takeover. 
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In this section we consider two cases: 
1- When the raid is on an unprotected firm (Section 4.1). 
2- When the raid is on a protected firm linked by participations (Section 4.2). 
We first define and compute the insider’s and outsider’s “impact” of a takeover, and then 
we define and compute the takeover incentives in each case using the two impacts previously 
calculated. 
 
4.1 Incentives to Raid an Unprotected Firm 
 
We use here comparative static to obtain the impact on a raider of triggering a hostile 
takeover of an unprotected firm. Insider’s impact is defined as the comparison between individual 
profits before the acquisition and joint profits
17
 of the raider after acquisition. The impact of the 
merger on insider’ profits is noted MI  and is computed by subtracting from the new merged 
firm )( ∗∗Mπ  the sum of the two unprotected individual firms 
∗
iπ(  and )
∗
jπ  profits before the 
buyout. Thus, 
 
)2()( ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ −=−−= iMjiMMI πππππ     (11) 
 
The sign of equation (11) is ambiguous and depends on the value of parameters of the 
model. After a study of the difference in equilibrium profits (the impact MI ), the most crucial 
factor is the value
18
 of the substitutability parameter γ. MI  is positive for low values of γ. The 
profitability of the raid (on an unprotected firm) has to be positive to study the effects of the 
defense in participations, we thus pose it as a condition for the rest of the study. We then 
investigate merger profitability for low values of γ. Further, an increase in market power with 
higher values of PHO α and lower number n of firms increases merger’s profitability. Indeed, a 
buyout in a more concentrated industry
19
 will always be more beneficial for the raider due to a 
greater increase in market power. Finally, it is straightforward to derive that the cost parameter c 
decreases profitability of a merger for all positive values. 
After the study of takeover impact on the insiders, we now study the outsider’s impact on 
an unprotected outsider’s firm in order to determine final incentives to merge (the comparison of 
the respective impacts). Outsider’s impact outI  represents the outsider’s profitability of staying 
outside a raid on an unprotected firm within the industry. It is defined as the comparison between 
individual profits of a non-raider firm before the acquisition and its individual profits after 
acquisition. It is computed in a similar manner to equation (11), by subtracting the pre-takeover 
value of an unprotected outsider profits ( )∗∗ = ik ππ  from the value of an unprotected outsider 
post-takeover profit )( ∗∗kπ : 
 
)( ∗∗∗ −= ikoutI ππ      (12) 
                                                           
17
 The merged firm profit includes the sum of the two previous individual profits. 
18
 All parameter solutions are graphically presented in the proofs in the Appendix. 
19
 Reducing the number of firms from 4 to 3 leads to a bigger increase in concentration than a reduction from 100 to 
99 (25% versus 1% respectively). 
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This expression has a positive sign for all (positive) values of the model parameters, 
meaning that outsider firms are always better off when there is a takeover in the industry. This 
phenomenon is due to the “outsider effect” which is reinforced when market power in the 
industry is stronger (i.e. for greater values of α and lower values of n). 
Finally, we define incentives which trigger a takeover. These incentives are determined 
by subtracting the impact of staying out of a takeover from the impact of launching a raid: 
outM II − . We obtain that 0<− outM II  for all (positive) values of the model parameters. Further, 
this negative incentive is reinforced when market power in the industry is stronger (i.e. for greater 
values of α and lower values of n). We conclude that in an industry where cross participations are 
possible it is always more profitable for a company to stay outside of an acquisition on an 
unprotected firm rather than to trigger a takeover. This result is consistent with the results of the 
“outsider effect” of mergers. 
 
4.2 Incentives to raid a Protected Firm 
 
Using the same process as in Section 4.1, we note ′MI  the impact on insiders’ profits of 
acquiring a firm protected by a defense in participations. In this case Firm i raids Firm 1 which is 
protected by a defense in participations with Firm 2. This insider’s impact is derived by 
subtracting the sum of individual profits of the two insiders firms ∗1(π  and )
∗
iπ  before the 
takeover from the profit expression of the new merged )( ∗∗∗′Mπ  firm: 
 
)( 1
∗∗∗∗∗′′ −−= iMMI πππ     (13) 
 
The sign of equation (13) is ambiguous, and as in the previous case it depends on the 
values of the parameter γ in particular. For low values of γ this expression is negative (whereas 
MI  is positive). Further, this negative impact is reinforced when market power in the industry is 
stronger (i.e. for greater values of α and lower values of n). The cost parameter c has a negative 
influence on profitability. 
The impact on outsiders’ profits in this case is noted ′outI . It is computed by subtracting 
pre-takeover profit of an unprotected firm ( )
∗∗ = ij ππ  from the individual outsider profit after the 
buyout ( )
∗∗∗
jπ : 
 
)( ∗∗∗∗′ −= ijoutI ππ      (14) 
 
In this case of a raid on a protected firm, outsiders’ profit impact is negative for low 
values of γ, but greater than ′MI . Further, this negative impact is reinforced when market power 
in the industry is stronger (i.e. for greater values of α and lower values of n). The cost parameter c 
has a negative influence on profitability. 
In this case of a raid on a protected firm, we use the same method to obtain the choice’s 
incentives to raid a rival firm or not. They are derived by subtracting outsider’s impact from 
insider’s impact: ′′ − outM II . We find that 0<−
′′
outM II  for low values of parameter γ. Further, 
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this negative incentive is reinforced when market power in the industry is stronger. The cost 
parameter c has a negative influence on profitability. Here also, the increase in profits for 
outsiders is more important. This leads us to conclude that in an industry where cross 
participations are possible it is always more profitable for a company to stay outside of an 
acquisition of a protected firm rather than to trigger it. This result is consistent with the “outsider 
effect” result of mergers. 
In Section 4, we determined a firm’s incentives to raid a protected or an unprotected rival 
in accordance with “the outsider effect” result of mergers. In Section 5.1, we test the efficacy of 
the defense in participations by comparing the values of the merger impacts MI  and MI
'
. 
Further, we expand the study area in Section 5.2 by comparing the impact of a takeover in a 
protected industry (with linked firms) with the impact of a takeover in an oligopoly industry 
where there are no PHO (a benchmark). 
 
5 Results and Propositions 
 
In this section, we demonstrate the efficiency of the defense in participations by comparing 
takeover incentives on a protected firm versus those on an unprotected firm in a protected 
industry (with firms acquiring participations). Further we expand the study tocompare takeovers 
in a protected versus an unprotected industry (the benchmark). 
 
5.1 Within an Industry with Participations 
 
We compare the insider’s impact on an unprotected firm MI  (positive for low values of γ) with 
the insider’s impact on a protected firm ′MI . The whole expression MM II
'−  is positive, and 
these incentives (within the industry) are reinforced by market power. This leads to a simple 
conclusion: takeover incentives on an unprotected firm are higher than those on a protected firm 
in a protected industry. The following proposition states this result: 
 
Proposition 1: The holding of cross participations in the capital of a competitor is an efficient 
defense against a hostile takeover. 
 
This proposition is explained by the value of the takeover impact. Since it is lower on an 
protected firm due to an increased “outsider effect”, a rational raider will prefer to raid an 
unprotected target.  
 
5.2 Within an Industry without Participations 
 
As a first step, we use an insider’s impact in a common Cournot oligopoly benchmark to expand 
our study and result in a wider framework. The difference lies in the absence of participations in 
this case. This insider impact follows the same computation method used previously, i.e. 
comparing the sum of profits pre and post takeover. We note 
′′
MI  the insider’s impact in a 
common (no participations) industry competing in quantities: the benchmark. The sign of this 
expression is ambiguous, like in the participations’ framework, and strongly depends on the value 
of the substitutability parameter γ. Here also, the takeover impact can still be positive for low 
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values of γ, and an increase in market power with a smaller number of firms (no participations α 
in this case) makes the takeover more profitable. 
 
5.3 Comparison among Industries 
 
As a second step, we now compare the insider’s impact MI  on an unprotected firm
20
 (in 
the case with participations) to insider’s impact 
′′
MI  in the benchmark. The sign of the difference 
′′
− MM II  is ambiguous, it is negative for low values of γ when market power is strong enough, 
and especially when the number of firms is big enough. This comparison shows that takeover 
incentives (among industries) are greater when there is no defense in participations. We then can 
deduce that )(
′′′
>> MMM III . This result highlights that a takeover is less profitable in an 
industry with participations as the incentives to merge are lower. We state this result in the 
following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: A takeover is less profitable in an industry where two of the firms are linked with a 
defense in participations than in one where no firms have a participations arrangement. 
 
This proposition is explained by the value of the (unprotected) takeover impact in an 
industry where two of the firms are defended with participations. Since it is lower due to an 
increased “outsider effect”, a rational raider will prefer to raid a target in an industry without a 
defense in participations. 
 
5.4 Regulation 
 
In contrast to literature results on the anticompetitive role of horizontal participations (Reitman, 
1994; Gilo et al., 2006) alone or as a toehold before a full takeover (Jovanovic & Wey, 2014), our 
analysis exposes the social benefits of PHO in our model. Indeed, the fact that participations 
constitute hurdles to hostile takeovers leads in the end to a less concentrated industry, even if in 
the beginning participations have lessened competition. These results have an implication in 
terms of regulation as they highlight the competitive role of cross horizontal participations.  
The defense in participations in Europe with the “golden shares”, “Deutschland AG” or 
“noyaux-durs” defers to the regulation of the European Commission and to the ruling the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the case of a dispute. Special rights of the Union’s members 
on private undertakings are discussed and examined to determine whether or not this falls within 
the ambit of the free movement of capital and payments. Lustig & Weil (2002) relate three ECJ 
rulings on participations and their link with corporate governance. In the case of Belgium, the 
ECJ granted the decision of giving notice to the responsible ministry of any changes in 
participations for the “Société Nationale de Transport par Canalisation” as well as the “Société de 
Distribution du Gaz SA” relating to a change in network facilities. In the case of France, the ECJ 
rejected the use of “golden shares” to secure approval of the Ministry of Economic Affairs when 
ceilings
21
 in participations were crossed for the “Société Nationale Elf-Aquitaine”. Finally in the 
case of Portugal, the ECJ denied the justification of Portugal to use its participations to block 
                                                           
20 
Because we already shown that takeover incentives are greater on an unprotected firm than on a protected one. 
21
 10%, 20%, or 30%. 
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foreign share acquisitions in privatised companies. In these three cases the European Commission 
attacked the countries’ decision to protect privatised companies using a defense in participations 
on the basis of an infringement of the “laisser-faire” of the market (free movement of capital and 
payments). 
Our paper explores mathematically the competition approach on this topic, and our 
theoretical results on the potential competitive role of PHO send a contrarian signal to the 
regulation agencies and the courts. We argue that the regulators and governments could take into 
account the findings introduced by this theoretical research to expand their comprehension of the 
defense in participations. Though the defense in participations could be counter to the free 
movement of capital on markets, it should be allowed under specific countries’ strategic 
circumstances (e.g. BAE-EADS merger) and also to counter the increase of concentration and 
market power in a particular industry. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
In this article, we study takeover incentives in a Cournot oligopoly model with two firms linked 
by cross participations following an anti-takeover defense strategy. We show that within an 
industry, PHO reduce incentives of competing firms to raid a protected firm by decreasing 
takeover profitability. We thus demonstrate that the defense in participations is meaningful and 
efficient to block hostile takeovers, and also has a competitive aspect. This competitive aspect is 
proven by the comparison of takeover incentives between two industries, one with the defense in 
participations and a benchmark without participations. As the full integration of a rival’s profits 
(buyout) is more harmful in terms of competition than partial ownerships, we suppose that 
authorizing PHO could thus have social benefits.  
Theoretical literature (see e.g. Malueg, 1992; O’brien & Salop, 2000) and applied work 
(see e.g. Perotti, 1992; Reiffen, 1998) investigate participations but do not link them with 
takeover incentives. Further, numerous articles highlight the role and functioning of different 
forms of golden shares across several countries: (Flath, 1990; Brown & Fung, 2009) on Keiretsu, 
Franks & Mayer (1998) and Lantenois (2011) on Deutschland AG, Yergin & Stanislaw (1998) on 
UK golden shares, and Goldstein (1996) for French “noyaux-durs”. In addition, Foros et al. 
(2011) derive the profitability of a partial (but controlling) ownership. The role of our article is to 
expose a theoretical study of the efficacy of the golden shares as a defense in participations in the 
context of mergers. 
To complement this article, a reverse study of the consequences of cross participations on 
protected firms’ incentives to raid competitors could be addressed in further research; this 
protection could be used in this case to “attack” competitors. This should prove decisive in the 
analysis of the influence of PHO on market concentration and on economic welfare. We believe 
that this paper sheds new light on the current analysis of competition in the case of a defense in 
participations. It also raises questions in the case of an “attack” and thus gives room for 
additional investigations. Therefore this study of equity strategies, against or supporting a buyout, 
could make policy makers change the current regulatory monitoring process and could intensify 
applied research on the subject. 
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Appendix 
 
Concavity of profits relative to quantities 
 
To prove the concavity of profit functions we examine the second order condition and derive the 
sign of this expression. 
We begin by the second order derivative of Firm i’s profit: 
 
02
²
²
<−=
∂
∂
i
i
q
π
 
The second order derivative being negative, the profit function iπ  is strictly concave relative to 
quantities. 
 
We now study profit functions of defended firms 1 and 2 linked by cross participations ,α  their 
profit expressions are symmetrical: 
022
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The second order derivative is positive for partial ownership value of 1<α . 
 
Expression of equilibrium profits 
 
Pre-takeover profits: 
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Profits after a takeover of an unprotected firm: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )2223232
222
2224424622
22221
nnnn
cA
M
γαγγαγγαγαγγαγαγ
ααγγγγ
π
+−−++−−−−++−
−−++−−+
=∗∗  
( ) ( )
( )2223232
22
222442462
222
nnnn
cA
k
γαγγαγγαγαγγαγαγ
αγαγ
π
+−−++−−−−++−
−−++−
=∗∗  
 
Profits after a takeover of a protected firm: 
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Sign study of impacts 
 
In the following, we represent graphically the value of MI  as a function of γ, n, and α. 
 
 
 
Fig 2. MI  as a function of model parameters. 
 
We highlight here the positive value of MI  for low values of γ. Further, we expose the 
positive relationship between the unprotected merger’s impact MI  and the market power. 
In the following, we represent graphically the value of 
′
MI  as a function of γ, n, and α. 
 
 
 
Fig 3. 
′
MI  as a function of model parameters. 
 
We highlight here the negative value of 
′
MI  for low values of γ. Further, we expose the 
negative relationship between the protected merger’s impact 
′
MI  and the market power. 
In the following, we represent graphically the value of 
′′
MI  as a function of γ, and n. 
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Fig 4. 
′′
MI  as a function of model parameters. 
 
We highlight here the positive value of 
′′
MI  for low values of γ. Further, we expose the 
positive relationship between the benchmark merger’s impact 
′′
MI  and the market power (a small 
number of firms, no participations in the benchmark). 
The study of these takeover impacts describes the links between the profitability of a 
merger and the market power, depending on the type of takeover. In addition, we expose positive 
values of MI  and 
′′
MI  for low values of γ, and this thus justifies the proposed condition. 
 
Sign study of incentives 
 
In the following, we represent graphically the value of the incentives to raid a protected firm: 
outM II −  as a function of γ, n, and α. 
 
 
 
Fig 5. outM II −  as a function of model parameters. 
 
We highlight here the negative value of the incentives to raid an unprotected firm: 
0<− outM II  for all values of γ. Further, this negative incentive is reinforced when market power 
in the industry is stronger. 
In the following, we represent graphically the value of the incentives to raid a protected 
firm: outM II '' −  as a function of γ, n, and α. 
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Fig 6. outM II '' −  as a function of model parameters. 
 
We highlight here the negative value of the incentives to raid a protected firm: 
0'' <− outM II  for low to average values of γ. Further, this negative incentive is reinforced when 
market power in the industry is stronger. 
The study of these two differences allows us to expose that in an industry where cross 
participations are possible it is always more profitable for a company to stay outside of an 
acquisition rather than to trigger it. This result is consistent with the “outsider effect”. 
 
In the following, we represent graphically the value of the incentives within the same 
industry: MM II
'− , as a function of γ, n, and α. 
 
 
 
Fig 7. MM II
'−  as a function of model parameters. 
 
We highlight here the positive value of the incentives to raid an unprotected firm versus a 
protected one in a protected industry. 0' >− MM II  for low to average values of γ. Further, this 
positive incentive is reinforced when market power in the industry is stronger. 
 
In the following, we represent graphically the value of the incentives among different 
industries: MM II
''−  as a function of γ, n, and α. 
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Fig 8. MM II
''−  as a function of model parameters. 
 
We highlight here the negative value of incentives to raid an unprotected firm versus the 
benchmark across different industries. 0'' <− MM II  for low to high values of γ, and a 
sufficiently high value of n. Adding precisions for low values of γ (but not extremely close22 to 
0) this result holds with the condition that MI  and MI
"
 are positive. Further, the amount α of 
the participations decreases the profitability of a takeover in a protected industry in comparison to 
an unprotected one. 
The study of these two differences yields )(
′′′
>> MMM III  which allows us to compare 
the incentives across the different industries in subsection 5.3 and to derive Proposition 2. 
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